More than half of Bulgarians believe that a small secret group makes all major decisions in world politics. Two thirds suspect that pharmaceutical companies are hiding cures for profit. Such beliefs are not harmless quirks: they shape how people vote, whether they trust public health advice and how receptive they are to disinformation – including Russian information operations, to which Bulgaria is particularly exposed.
The case study ‘Conspiracism in Comparison: The Case of Bulgaria will be published as a pre-print this October and in print in early 2027 as part of an anthology by Nomos. It forms part of a series of eight country studies within the Horizon Europe research project TaCT-FoRSED and examines how democratic structures and conspiracy thinking influence one another. The lead author is Prof. Todor Hristov. At the same time, a comparative study is currently being published. The author of this study is Dr Stefan Christoph.
Key findings for Bulgaria:
- Among Europe’s highest: In the European Social Survey, 55.7 per cent agreed that a “small secret group” runs world politics – the second-highest value in the EU, far above the European average of 32.9 per cent.
- A triple deficit: Bulgarians overwhelmingly endorse democracy in principle, yet 81 per cent feel the political system gives them little or no influence, and 43.7 per cent feel not at all capable of taking part in politics.
- A shared narrative of the “captured state”: Nationalist and liberal actors alike describe the state as controlled by hidden oligarchic interests – partly reflecting real governance failures.
- Media vulnerability: Bulgaria ranks last in the EU on the Media Literacy Index, while daily news consumption is high.
What makes the Bulgarian case stand out is that conspiracy thinking does not simply replace democratic convictions. “Conspiracy thinking can coexist with, and even be expressed through, democratic aspirations when democratic institutions have failed to instantiate those aspirations,” the authors write. In such an environment, they conclude, conspiracy theories “are not an anomaly but a structural feature.” The finding matters beyond Bulgaria: measuring support for democracy in surveys may say little about whether citizens trust the institutions that are supposed to put it into practice. The study therefore sees political self-efficacy – the sense of being able to make a difference – as the most critical deficit and the most promising point of intervention, alongside reforms of the judiciary and media regulation. An active urban NGO scene, engaged young people and EU membership act as counterweights, although their effect remains limited.
In addition to Bulgaria, the research team examined Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom. Initial findings from the comparison of the cases:
- “There is no evidence to suggest that conspiracy ideologies are more widespread today than in the past. Nevertheless, it is not a false impression that we have this perception: even if there are not necessarily more people holding these views, conspiracy ideologies appear to have become more politically and socially influential in recent years,” the authors write.
- This is due in particular to the influence of the so-called meso-level. This includes, for example, political actors and the establishment of dedicated media networks promoting conspiracy ideologies. On the one hand, these actors aggregate conspiracy-based attitudes from the general public; on the other, they make politics and society more receptive to conspiracy ideologies.
- However, the specific content of conspiracy ideologies also plays a role in their appeal. In the countries studied, there are five main narratives, ranging from migration to health policy.
Scientific approach
Methodologically, the study is a secondary analysis: rather than conducting new surveys, the team brought together existing data – population surveys, international democracy indices, historical research and media studies. A shared analytical framework makes the eight countries comparable. It distinguishes three levels – state and institutions; parties, movements and media; and individual attitudes – and three democratic resources: democratic identity, resilience and efficacy (the sense of political influence). The approach is exploratory: it maps relationships rather than proving causes.
About the research team
Professor Todor Hristov is a sociologist and literary theorist and associated professor at the University of Sofia). He was supported in the study by Ivelina Ivanova (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), Michelle Colleen Schweitzer (Leipzig University), Sebastian Schwarzweller and D Stefan Christoph (both from the University of Passau). The latter is the head author of a comparative study in conspiracism in Europe, based on these eight case studies. He leads a qualitative oriented Work Package in the Horizon Europe project TaCT FoRSED, co-ordinated by the University of Passau.
Funding statement
The European Union is funding the project over a period of three years as part of the Horizon Europe programme (funding agreement 101178926 in the call "Past, present and future of democracies; HORIZON CL2-2024-DEMOCRACY-01").
Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the REA can be held responsible for them.